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    I. The Kosovo crisis – problems of legitimacy. 
    The crisis in Kosovo opened the door to a completely new type of international 
involvement and management of local inter-communal clashes. It’s already been more 
than 120 years since the international community (in the format of the “European 
Concert of Powers”) has intervened for the first time into a local crisis, using the 
arguments of humanity and human rights defense. This happened in 1876 when the 
Ottoman Empire defeated a rebellion of the Bulgarian population, claiming 
independence from the Porte. The huge atrocities of the Ottoman troops against the 
civilian population have actually lead to mass scale public opinion condemnation in 
Europe and in the US and brought the ‘Great Powers’ on the conference table in 
Constantinople in resolving the ‘Eastern Question’. 
    Mass-scale violations of human rights have been in the focus of the international 
public opinion and the community of democratic states throughout the 20C. That 
stimulated the sophistication of international law in many aspects – limiting the means 
of legitimate warfare, establishing clear status for refugees, military prisoners of war, 
civilians in war stricken regions, etc. The League of Nations, established in 1919 as 
an instrument to preserve the new status quo in post war Europe and to contain 
revisionist attempts on behalf of the defeated nations, has been the first precedent of 
an international organization (even if very fragile and ineffective one), aimed at 
mediating among the nations’ interests from the position of defined principles, 
including the principles of human rights observation. 
    The Holocaust and other immense atrocities of the Nazi machine throughout World 
War II brought to the international scene the UNO as the first precedent of an 
international institution, capable of enforcing decisions made. At the same time it was 
effectively restricted in its instruments to do that in most of the individual cases when 
the UNO has opposed inhumane practices around the world. The logic of the Cold 
War has substantively reduced the ability of the UNO to prosecute major cases of 
human rights violations, even if those cases have been treated by the Assembly 
resolutions or even by the Security Council decisions. 
    In all cases of international treatment of human rights’ abuse throughout th 20 
century one basic principle of the international system has dominated both the logic of 
international decision making and the practical interventions into conflict stricken 
areas. This is the principle of national sovereignty and the legitimacy of the sovereign 
national decision making over the particular process – subject of international 
concern. If we, for example, take a look at the so called ‘third basket’ of the Helsinki 
Act of 1975, what we’ll see formulated is the principle right to monitor human rights 
status in a nation state. The latter, though, goes together with the obligation of the 
state not to impede, but to support such an independent monitoring. 
    The crises of disintegrating Yugoslavia – among other comparable events in the 
post Cold War world - have caused gradually developing precedents both of 
undermining the sovereignty of decision making at nation state level (through 
relativating the very concept of state sovereignty), and of international interference 
with strong obligatory enforcement. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the nation 
state as a sole legitimate agent in the international relations has been to a large extent 
replaced by the autonomous participation in the international crisis management of 
the conflicting parties’ leaders – the Muslim Boshniaks, the Serbs and the Herzeg 
Bosnia Croats. The internationally recognized sovereign – the state of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – had no practical legitimacy to play a role, larger than the Muslim party 
representation. The confusion of this semi-legitimate international status of the three 
conflicting communities has become explicitly obvious at Dayton, where the 
legitimacy problems have been resolved through involving the presidents of two 
neighboring states – Serbia and Croatia as parties to the agreement for peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
    The Bosnian crisis has shown the largest ever involvement of international 
organizations into a conflict management process. The EU, the OSCE, the UNO, 
NATO – to enlist only the major ones – have been direct participants in managing the 
conflict, even if their efforts have been ineffective for years. Only the combination of 
UNO Security Council resolutions and the willingness of NATO to execute them have 
finally produced the fragile resolution of the crisis at Dayton. The UNO – NATO 
partnership combined the legitimacy of the international organization with the 
executive ability of the military-political union, for the first time acting out of the 
zone of its principle responsibilities. 
    The Kosovo crisis represented a difficult case of legitimizing an international 
involvement from its very beginning. First, the crisis took place in the undisputed 
sovereign territory of the FR Yugoslavia. Unlike Bosnia, where the majority of the 
population (Serbs and Croats) has disputed the very statehood, Kosovo represents 
integrative territory of the Republic of Serbia – the bigger partner in the rump-
Yugoslav federation. The Albanians – whose position within the territory and the state 
constitution has been the focus of dispute – represented a significant minority within 
the state of Serbia. Changing, or improving their status could be a result of sovereign 
Serb – Yugoslav decision making process. The legitimate body of international 
intervention – the UNO – could act as a strong mediator, enforcing international 
peace-keeping mission in the disputed region, but the UNO could have no authority 
either to control larger territory of the FRY, or to change the status of Kosovo itself. 
This is the framework, in which all international actors, mediating in the crisis 
operated until the end of 1998. The first significant point of departure has been 
Rambouillet. 
    The draft agreement, proposed to the Serb delegation at Rambouillet contained 
many unacceptable elements for the Milosevic regime in Belgrade. Giving up controls 
over the disputed Kosovo region under a peaceful agreement would present Milosevic 
as a traitor in the eyes of the nationalist Serb public opinion. The strong man in 
Belgrade had already once felt the strength of his angry fellow compatriots after 
having signed the Dayton agreement against the will of the Bosnian Serbs. This time 
the reaction could be even stronger. That was enough argument to refuse signature at 
Rambouillet. But the draft agreement, prepared by the leaders of the West for 
Rambouillet contained one more significant obstacle to an easy surrender on behalf of 
Belgrade. According to the draft clauses and amendments, the peace keeping units of 
the NATO (not of the UN) in Kosovo would have free access to the entire territory of 
the FRY without being subject to the internal Yugoslav law. Obeying to such a clause 
would mean principle surrender of the FRY sovereignty on behalf of Milosevic 
regime. Such a precondition appears for the first time in an international effort to 
monitor and mediate in a crisis region in order to serve the observation of human 
rights there. 
    The propagandist legitimization of the NATO campaign against official Belgrade 
was built around the global character of the human rights principles and the 
responsibilities of the ‘international community’ to defend those rights in a global 
world. The growing integrity of uniting Europe was used as a powerful additional 
argument. But the split between the positions of the major Western leaders, united 
around the NATO, and the UNO, where Russia and China hold veto powers at the 
Security Council, has reduced the legitimacy of the ‘international community’ further 
action to the arguments of the major Western powers. The military campaign against 
Belgrade was carried out as a result of the united will of those Western powers. Only 
after Milosevic gave up to the military pressure and opened the door to the 
international peace keepers of KFOR, agreement involving the UNO as a formal 
agency of control over the international force had been made possible. These 
developments have outlined a new framework of international action legitimization in 
the field of conflict management. 
    First, the national sovereignty is no longer an obstacle to international action, when 
major violations of human rights are considered to have occurred. That will have 
major implications upon the entire international system. Viewing international 
relations in substance, smaller countries in numerous regions of the world have often 
been considered sovereign only de jure. Poverty and economic crises, strong 
neighbors and traditional imperial masters have often reduced national sovereignty to 
a nominal existence. The entire Soviet block throughout the Cold War has been 
constituted of sovereign on paper satellites. Kosovo, though, represents a precedent in 
which human rights concerns have been considered as a senior and more valuable 
principle of the international system, than the principle of sovereignty. This has 
immediately raised the question about the legitimate authority, capable to judge where 
is the point, in which sovereignty gives up its primacy to the human rights concerns. 
If sovereignty becomes relative, what will be the institutional basis of the 
international system from now on? 
    Second, there is no valid international authority to make decisions and act on behalf 
of the community of nations in cases of violent crises or major conflicts. The UNO 
and its Security Council do not, obviously, reflect the new power structures of the 
post Cold War world. In the case of Kosovo, the leaders of the West decided to 
bypass the UNO and act against Belgrade, legitimizing NATO as the new instrument 
of executing the decisions of the ‘international community’, thus de-legitimizing the 
‘great power’ status of Russia and China. The NATO summit in Washington D.C., 
celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Alliance, adopted in effect a new framework of 
the NATO strategy and territorial range of operation, involving Central and Eastern 
Europe as parts of the Alliance’s legitimate territory of action. Of course, this new 
strategic framework has been based on the evident will of most Central and Eastern 
European countries to join NATO and to be part of the Euro Atlantic security system. 
NATO’s obligation to act in favor of human rights defense has additionally been 
legitimized by the fact that only nations with democratic political systems may 
constitute the Alliance’s membership. But this set of arguments does not resolve the 
major issue, stemming from the substitution of the UNO – the world international 
organization – with a military-political alliance with regional scope of its mission. In 
the case of NATO Kosovo action democratic nations defend a minority, subjected to 
violent atrocities by an authoritarian regime. What if a regional organization, 
defending religious or cultural identity with fundamentalist principles interferes into a 
sovereign nation from the same region, legitimizing its action with the argument that 
this non-compliant nation does not observe ‘the values and the principles of …’ 
Europe and the Western world could not successfully defend the precedent of a 
regional scope organization’s military action against a sovereign country with the 
argument that ‘our values are humane, and more than that – universal’. In a culturally 
diverse world international law will be less capable than ever to tell the difference 
between Western laic values, Christian values, or Islamic and Hindu values, 
concerning human rights or any other field of value systems definition. 
    Third, loosing the authority of the single international organization, which builds 
up a process of consensus on international conflict management action, and reducing 
the status of national state sovereignty in the international system impairs the legal 
definitions of the necessary threshold to international intervention. The world 
becomes much more relative in terms of responsibilities and rights. We live in a 
multicultural world. We have always lived in a multicultural world. What makes the 
difference today is that we assess positively the fact of multicultural living. This 
positive assessment, though, does not make it easier to define the rules of 
multicultural living. The nation state sovereignty has always been based on the 
principle of self-determination. A community becomes a sovereign only after proving 
it is a nation. (Long term struggles and dear victims usually pave the road to national 
emancipation in an entire epoch of human history – the epoch of the modern world.) 
A democratic nation has the obligation to observe the rights of all its citizens, 
including those belonging to minority communities, without being obliged to 
recognize those minorities’ right to self-determination. Turning this principle into a 
relative one, opens the door to an endless process of communal claims for self-
determination, with no possible end up. The endless self-determination process 
promises an endless chain of inter-communal conflicts and endless interventions of 
the ‘international communities’, aimed at human rights defense and at restoring 
peaceful coexistence. An endless chain of international protectorates, devouring 
humanitarian aid and preventing hostile clans to sit at each other’s throats may well 
replace the imperfect, but stable world of sovereign states. 
    Let’s take a look at Bosnia and Kosovo. Enormous amounts of international funds 
maintain weak protectorate administrations, presiding upon intense corruption and 
organized crime, tense inter-communal relations and continuous efforts to ethnic 
cleansing, performed by the currently stronger communities. The structural weakness 
of the ‘international community’ to deal with escalating communal claims has been 
perfectly well demonstrated in the process of ex-Yugoslavia’s disintegration. The first 
step has been to recognize the constituent republics. The next challenge immediately 
followed – Bosnia, an entity, which had no autonomous chance to survive the internal 
clash. A second step – semi-recognition of the constituent Bosnian parties, clashing 
with each other. Step three – uneasy peace, sponsored by the ‘international 
community’, and involving as “mediators” the war lords themselves – Milosevic, 
Tudman and Izetbegobic have been the signatories in the peace, following their own 
war… Fourth step – Kosovo. The ‘international mediator’ Milosevic becomes 
indicted war criminal… Step five …? 
    If we come back to the Kosovo case, the challenges of legitimizing an international 
action do not stop with the successful end of the NATO campaign against Belgrade. 
The comparison between means and ends and – in particular – between aims and 
results brings us to an environment of multiplying crises, stemming out of unresolved 
old dilemmas. 
    First, the Kosovo action of NATO against Belgrade did not stop mass scale human 
rights abuse, even if it had successfully prevented a huge massacre of Kosovar 
Albanians, planned by the Milosevic regime. In the past nine months, systematic 
abuse of human rights of the now victorious Albanians over the minority Serbs has 
been taking place under the helpless observation of KFOR units, designed to perform 
military actions, but helpless in performing policing functions. The ethnic intolerance 
of Albanians in Kosovo affects not only the Serbs, yet all other ethnic communities – 
Roma, Turks, Slav Muslims etc. 
    Second, the protectorate status of Kosovo resembles a contradictory structure. 
Kosovo is a legal part of Serbia, and Kosovo is practically separated territory with its 
own currency, border controls, customs, dependent on foreign donors and organized 
crime economy, aiming at full independence. Thus Kosovo represents an important 
test case of the unavoidable change of borders as a primary consequence of war. 
Europe resolved its ethnic clashes after the World War II on the basis of two 
interconnected principles: inviolability of borders and respect to minority rights. One 
could say – if Milosevic failed to observe minority rights in Kosovo, he would now 
face separation. Without going into too much detail – the separation of Kosovo could 
not remain a single case in the international system in the Balkan region and in 
Europe. If a minority succeeded once to receive its independence as a gift from the 
international community, many other minorities are very likely to follow this tempting 
lead. If Kosovar Albanians could become independent, what obstacle – in terms of 
reason or international law – could prevent the independence of the Bosnian Serbs 
and Croats? A potential independence of Kosovo would immediately affect the 
stability of neighboring Macedonia, opening in this way the entire Pandora’s box of 
old Balkan ethnic and nationalist strife. 
    Separatism and international protectorate buffer zones against separatism are hiding 
one more evidence of long-term legitimacy shortage: the new structure of Kosovo - 
administrative and economic - does not promise easy recovery. The region is 
overwhelmed by the organized crime economy and politics, which function on the 
basis of adverse clan competition. No effective law and order could be installed in this 
entirely criminal zone, where nobody feels secure for his/her life or property. If the 
community and its international sponsors could not establish the basics of decent 
institutions in Kosovo, what could we count at for the future? The restoration of Serb 
control is impossible and unjust. The capacity for decent self-rule is almost non-
existent. How many years of international protectorate administration and how many 
billions of dollars could rebuild a legitimate order in Kosovo, thus preventing a crisis 
spill over into the Balkans? How many places like Kosovo do we have on the 
Balkans…? In Europe…? In the World…? How many cases like Kosovo do we face 
today…? And tomorrow…? The day after tomorrow…? 
    Thomas Hobbs argued that no Leviathan (or reasonable order) is possible in the 
field of international relations. The process of international system’s development in 
the next centuries tried to prove this Hobbs' thesis wrong. The consent of sovereign 
nations upon particular principles, norms and values, has made it possible to 
distinguish (within a reasonable risk of relativism) between legitimate and illegitimate 
behavior at the international scene. How could we establish a legitimate new 
international system, if the universal rule of normative consent among sovereign 
nations is being replaced by the flexible qualitative considerations upon the human 
rights records of different states and regimes, selectively applied after the real politik 
interest of a current ‘international community’? (Flexibility is evident in comparing 
the Kosovo and Chechnya cases, where dealing with a ‘Great Power’ as Russia makes 
the only difference to dealing with the little nasty regime in Belgrade.) Human rights 
represent a value system. We either have to convince the entire world in a quantifiable 
normative version of our human rights observation standards, or we have to face an 
international system, built on relative bases. 
    Legitimacy is a process of consensual empowerment, which makes it particularly 
difficult to develop international authority, enjoying legitimate influence upon a 
growing diversity of cultures (that is – diversity of values), intensely communicating 
in the global world. The motivation of the different actors, involved in the Kosovo 
crisis represents an illustration of this problem. 
    II. The Kosovo crisis – the motivation of the actors. 
    The actors in the Kosovo crisis seem to interact dynamically with each other, but 
this is only at the level of physical contact. At the level of value motivation to act, the 
participants often represent parallel universes with no relationship among them. Who 
are they, the actors? 
    The Albanian community of Kosovo represents the passionate, emotional 
nationalism of a young nation, what Albanians really are. Like all young nationalists, 
Albanians try to enter the modern world of nation statehood, motivated by pre-
modern, primordial perceptions of the world. Albanians fight for land, and rely upon 
clan solidarity. Their blood tells them the truth about who is a friend or foe. They do 
not admit alien blood into their community. They live together in a collectivist 
extended family structure, where membership is subject to a sole criterion – proven 
origin. This is why Albanians do not live with ‘the others’. The aliens – that is the 
non-Albanians – have their own, non-intersecting territorial and spiritual realms. This 
is to explain the ethnic cleansing not only of the Serb foes, but also of all non-
Albanians from the territory of Kosovo, once after the Albanian community took over 
control with the KFOR presence. 
    Serb nationalism shares most of the above mentioned features of the Albanian 
community, even if it is much older and on the defensive side. As former masters of 
the Yugoslav quasi-empire, Serbs have developed the art of assimilating other ethnic 
groups with violence or cultural sophistication. The myth of the Serb identity, though, 
is as primordial and organic as the Albanian claim for ethnic communal purity. The 
legendary prince Lazar, who preferred Heavenly immortal victory for the Serbs to the 
victory in the real battle against the Ottomans at Kosovo pole represents the 
transcedental legitimacy of the Serb claim of control over Kosovo. The Kosovo defeat 
in 1399 sanctified the Serbs into a heavenly nation and no authority on Earth could 
reclaim this holy background of Serb national identity. 
    The Serb – Albanian dispute on Kosovo has the architecture of a medieval spiritual 
drama, where no compromise between the alternative parties seems possible. The 
global world with its new images and rules intervened in this drama in a really 
dramatic fashion. The leaders of the West represent a new international elite, whose 
perception of warfare has largely been shaped after the CNN imaging of the Desert 
Storm operation in the Gulf. ‘Human rights war’ has become possible, because it is a 
bloodless war. The ‘good guys’ are high in the sky and the ‘bad guys’ suffer 45 000 
feet below, where only the computer smoke of Star Wars-like explosions makes us 
guess how severe the punishment is. Those, who got punished for no guilt are isolated 
into the peripheral category of ‘co-lateral damage’, representing the unavoidable risk 
of life. This picture substantially reduces the psychological threshold to accept the 
war as a normal event or fact of life. 
    In this context of ‘post-modern’ warfare Kosovo represented a low risk opportunity 
for the US President Bill Clinton to reclaim moral authority on the international 
scene, after having lost a substantial portion of it back home. Of course, we could not 
question President Clinton’s administration devotion to the human rights cause, which 
has been very actively manifested by the State Secretary Madeline Albright. Raised 
in a Czech family during the World War II, Ms. Albright’s passionate participation 
into the Kosovo campaign brought back to the political columns the forgotten notion 
of the ‘Munich Syndrome’. In 1938 the democratic leaders of France and Britain gave 
up the road to the still vulnerable Nazi dictator Hitler, permitting him to occupy 
Czechoslovakia and –later on – the entire Europe. The lesson of history, which Ms. 
Albright has learned on the example of her own life, is – ‘beat the dictator while he’s 
small’. 
    European political landscape has been – and still is – dominated by leaders of 
explicit left-wing legacy at the time of the Kosovo crisis. Most of those European 
politicians have started their conscious political life as pacifist demonstrators or anti-
NATO campaigners in the Cold War era, when the successful performance of NATO 
has been crucial to the survival of the Western world. What has persuaded all those 
people, raised in the wave of 1968 culture, to support the NATO campaign against a 
brutal, but small Balkan dictator? How could Tony Blair and Xavier Solana present 
themselves as bigger ‘hawks’, compared to Jesse Helms or Henry Kissinger? We 
could offer many answers to those questions, but one of them is for sure true. The new 
generation left leaders of Europe are in search for their place in the history of 
unification and integration of the Old Continent. Schuman and Monet developed the 
idea of European unity. De Gaulle and Adenauer gave birth to the European 
integration as an expanding process. Miterand and Kohl mastered the Maastricht 
treaty, transforming the economic community into political, economic and social 
European Union. Now what is left for Blair, Schroder, Prodi and Solana is to achieve 
the EU enlargement and extend the values and principles of democratic, united 
Europe throughout the territory of the continent – even over the dark Balkans, which 
European legacy might be argued… 
    This picture would be incomplete, if missing the attitudes of Russia and China. 
Suffering from its heavy post-imperial syndrome, Russia expressed authentic 
‘geopolitical anger’ at the NATO attack on the ‘Serb brothers’. Pushed back in its 
borders before Peter the Great, Russia was furious to see the Balkans – the last 
‘legitimate sphere of Russian interest’, and Serbia – the faithful Russian gendarme – 
attacked by the ‘wily West’. A defeat for Serbia should certainly mean cutting Russia 
off the Adriatic and dramatically reducing the remnants of Russian presence into the 
Mediterranean basin. 
    China fully cashed the accident with its embassy in Belgrade. The Kosovo crisis 
was a truly legitimate opportunity to show up as a world power – a status Beijing will 
not be late to reclaim many times from now on. 
    This small excursion into the motivation of the key actors of the Kosovo crisis 
explicitly shows the limits of legitimacy in an integrated international action, based on 
values with no clear normative consent behind them. If we tend to act on the basis of 
the purely value systems’ motivation, we have to face the ‘clash of civilizations’ 
paradigm. This paradigm may seem affordable from the perspective of a resident of 
Cambridge – Massachusetts, but it is certainly painful for the residents of the Balkans 
and many other regions of the world, where different cultures intersect and create 
environment of plural value systems. If the global world has to be a place of law and 
order, it should be governed by explicit rules of reason, capable to ‘translate’ values 
and interests into operational norms. Responsibility of observing those norms and 
rules should be claimed from the legitimate members of the international community. 
Do we consider it possible to replace national sovereignty with a plurality of actors 
into an increasingly relative world of global interaction? Can we consider entities as 
‘international civil society’ or ‘international community’ as structured and responsible 
enough to reclaim sovereignty from the ‘out-fashioned nation states’? 
    No doubt – a new international system in the global world will represent much of 
the traditional clash of interest, much of the traditional relative value of international 
law interpretations, typical for the modern world. But if we stick to the tradition of 
reasonable translation of diverse interests into easily comprehensible consensual 
norms, equal for all international actors, then we have bigger chances to reproduce at 
least a relative law and order in the global village, where consensus upon values is not 
possible. Human rights respect – as we understand it - should be essential part of this 
‘New World Order’, where we have to try to install it into the status of consensual 
norm. And the global sheriff should treat all violators equally – because this is the 
law. 
    Within the upcoming new international system of the global world, the Kosovo 
crisis opens the door to optional tendencies of development in human rights’ status. 
This first ‘human rights’ war’ underlines the importance of respect for all human 
beings. It sends a clear warning to all dictators – present and future – about the end of 
their immunity to act against the international standards of humanity. At the same 
time, the Kosovo crisis and its aftermath have clearly shown the relative nature of 
international human rights concerns, the immature instruments of human rights 
defense within a controversial situation of tense inter-communal clash. There’s a 
danger in this immature ability to bring justice for all from the perspective of human 
rights defense. This is the danger of a growing number of people, believing that the 
notion of human rights reflects an idealistic value system, which is incorrectly used to 
disguise illegitimate hidden aims. 
 
